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Abstract—Borgs et al. [2016] investigated essential require-
ments for communities in preference networks. They defined six
axioms on community functions, i.e., community detection rules.
Though having elegant properties, the practicality of this axiom
system is compromised by the intractability of checking two
critical axioms, so no nontrivial consistent community function
was reported in [Borgs et al., 2016]. By adapting the two axioms
in a natural way, we propose two new axioms that are efficiently-
checkable. We show that most of the desirable properties of the
original axiom system are preserved. More importantly, the new
axioms provide a general approach to constructing consistent
community functions. We further find a natural consistent
community function that is also enumerable and samplable,
answering an open problem in the literature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Clustering individuals in a social network, called community
detection, is a fundamental task in graph mining and has
been adequately studied. Community detection has different
forms, depending on whether overlapping communities are
allowed [Palla et al., 2005; Baumes et al., 2005; Zhang et al.,
2007; Ahn et al., 2009], whether hierarchical structures are
taken into account [Sibson, 1973], and in which form of the
data is provided, etc. People proposed a number of algo-
rithms to find communities, based on different principles such
as spectral clustering [Hoffman, 1973], density-based meth-
ods [Ester et al., 1996], modularity-based method [Newman,
2006]. No matter which form and which algorithm we choose,
a community is usually considered as a group of closely related
individuals. However, “a group of closely related individuals”
is a rather rough concept, and there does not exist a widely
accepted definition of communities.
In this paper, we try to axiomatize the concept of communi-
ties. We allow overlapping communities and assume the data
is given in a preference network.
Kleinberg [2003] developed an axiomatic framework for
non-overlapping clusterings and defined clustering functions
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whose inputs are a set V of n individuals and pairwise
distances between these n individuals and whose output is
a partition of these vertices (i.e., overlapping communities are
not allowed). He found that three desired clustering axioms
(scale-invariance, richness and consistency) cannot be satisfied
at the same time.
But this negative result did not prevent researchers
from investigating axiomatic aspects of clusterings.
Meil [2005] proposed axioms to compare clusterings.
Ben-David and Ackerman [2008] introduced axioms on
clustering quality measures. Zadeh and Ben-David [2009]
presented a unique theorem for clustering and showed that
the impossibility result in [Kleinberg, 2003] can be avoided
by relaxing one of clustering axioms. Ackerman et al. [2010]
introduced several more properties of clustering functions to
taxonomize a set of popular clustering algorithmic paradigms
and strengthened the impossibility result on these properties.
Gollapudi and Sharma [2009] devised an evaluation method
to characterize the axioms.
Following this line but in a more general sense, Borgs et al.
[2016] recently initiated the axiomization of overlapping com-
munities over preference networks. A preference network is a
finite set of individuals each having a preference indicating
his/her affinity with others. As an expressive model, it covers
graphs, a structure that is commonly used in the field of
community detection. Borgs et al. [2016] proposed a system
of six axioms for community functions and showed various
properties of this system.
Among the properties, the lattice structure and the intersec-
tion lemma are most striking, because they serve as a guideline
to construct desirable community functions. Specifically, the
lattice structure means that the axioms satisfying all the six ax-
ioms form a lattice under the natural “∪” and “∩” operations.
Borgs et al. also identified the bottom (the minimum, called
Ccliq) and the top (the maximum, called Ccomp) of this lattice.
The intersection lemma claims that a community function
satisfies all the axioms if and only if it is the intersection
of Ccomp and a community function satisfying four axioms
which are simple and easy to conform. The significance of
the intersection lemma is that it paves a way to construct a
community function satisfying all the axioms, while the lattice
structure enables to derive more such community functions on
this basis.
However, Borgs et al. [2016] did not construct any non-
trivial community function satisfying all the axioms. This is
mainly due to the fact that it is coNP-complete to check
two of the axioms, namely Group Stability (GS ) and Self-
Approval (SA). Furthermore, GS and SA play critical roles
in this axiomization for two reasons. First, only they cover
the stability of communities, while an unstable community
does not make sense, especially in the context of preference
networks. As an analogue, consider the stable matching prob-
lem where affinity among the players is determined by their
preferences and the stability of matchings is the focus (see
e.g., Gusfield and Irving [1989]). Second, these two axioms
set the top of the lattice. The coNP-completeness of the two
most important axioms surely compromises the practicality of
the axiom system.
On this ground, we make an effort to improve the axiom
system in [Borgs et al., 2016] and construct desired commu-
nity functions. Our contributions are fourfold.
1) We show that axiom SA can degenerate so as to be
checkable in polynomial time, leaving the axiom system
equivalent.
2) We propose an efficiently checkable alternative axiom
SGS to the original GS . The modification is natural, and
preserves all the good properties of the original axiom
system.
3) We present a general approach to construct nontrivial
community functions that conform to the new axiom
systems.
4) We find a natural, consistent, constructive, enumerable,
and samplable community function, answering an open
problem in [Borgs et al., 2016]. Note that both this
community function and the just-mentioned general ap-
proach remain valid in the original axiom system, but
the construction essentially depends on the new axiom
SGS .
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we re-
view some necessary notions and notations, and show that SA
can be replaced by a simpler axiom. We define a strengthening
alternative to the crucial axiom GS in Section III, named SGS .
In Section IV, we prove that SGS is efficiently checkable, and
various desirable properties of the original axiom system are
prereserved. In Section V, we present a systematic approach to
finding consistent and constructive community functions, and
find an ideal community function. Finally, we conclude this
paper in Section VI with future works and open problems.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we consider community detection as a task
that translates a preference network into a set of communities.
First of all, we review the definition of preference networks
and the axiom system introduced by Borgs et al. [2016], and
show some properties of the axiom system.
A. Preference networks
A preference network is a finite set of individuals each of
which ranks all the individuals (including herself) in (strict)
order of preference.
Formally, consider a non-empty set V = {1, 2, . . . , n} and
L(V ), the set of all total orders on V .
A total order π ∈ L(V ) is equivalently defined as a bijection
π : V → V , denoted by [v1v2 . . . vn] where vi = π−1(i) for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. For any u, v ∈ V and π ∈ L(V ), π(u) is
referred to as the rank of u in π, and we say that π prefers u
to v if π(u) < π(v), denoted by u ≻pi v.
A preference profile Π on V is a list of total orders
{πu}u∈V ∈ L(V )V on V . Given u, v, w ∈ V , we say that
u prefers v to w if so does πu, denoted by v ≻piu w. Given
a preference profile Π on V , the pair N = (V,Π) is called a
preference network.
A community function is a function C that maps each
preference network N = (V,Π) to a collection C(N) ⊆ 2V .
Each S ∈ C(N) is called a community of N defined by C, and
the term “defined by C” will be omitted if clear from context.
As an example, consider the community function
Ccliq(V,Π) = {S ⊆ V : ∀u, v ∈ S, ∀w ∈ V − S, v ≻piu w}.
Every community S defined by Ccliq is called a clique1.
Roughly speaking, a clique is a subset of individuals preferring
each other to those not in the subset.
Example 1: We consider two families in a village and each
family has three members. The members in a family have the
same preference and they prefer their own family members
to other villagers. In this case, every family is a community.
Formally, suppose N = (V,Π) is the preference network
where V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, π1 = π2 = π3 = [123456] and
π4 = π5 = π6 = [456123]. Sets {1, 2, 3} and {4, 5, 6} are in
Ccliq(N).
Actually preference frameworks have been used in
various occasions, e.g., voting [Gale and Shapley, 1962;
Gusfield and Irving, 1989; Roth, 1984a], network routing
[Rekhter and Li, 1994; Caesar and Rexford, 2005], and coali-
tion formation in collaborative games [Brams et al., 2003;
Roth, 1984b]. Balcan et al. [2013] further elaborated on how
the concept of preference networks properly models social
networks and why it essentially captures their underlying
community structures.
B. Existing axioms
Borgs et al. [2016] proposed six axioms for community
functions. They are included here for the paper to be self-
containing. Let’s arbitrarily fix a non-empty finite set V and
a community function C.
Axiom 1 (Anonymity(A)): Let S, S′ ⊆ V , and Π,Π′ be two
preference profiles on V . Assume that S′ = σ(S) and Π′ =
σ(Π) for some permutation σ : V → V . Then S ∈ C(N) if
and only if S′ ∈ C(N ′), where N = (V,Π) and N ′ = (V,Π′).
1Note that a clique in a preference network does not mean it is a complete
subgraph.
This axiom means that whether S is a community is
determined by the preference profile rather than by labels of
the individuals.
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity(Mon)): Let S ⊆ V , and Π,Π′ be
two preference profiles on V . If u ≻pis v ⇒ u ≻pi′s v for
∀s, u ∈ S and ∀v ∈ V , then S ∈ C(N)⇒ S ∈ C(N ′), where
N = (V,Π) and N ′ = (V,Π′).
Intuitively, monotonicity means that if the change of the
preference profile does not decrease the ranking of any mem-
ber of a community and preserves the relative ranking among
the members, then the community remains. This is reasonable
since the affinity among the members of the community is
improved after the preference profile is changed.
Axiom 3 (Embedding(Emb)): Given two preference net-
works N = (V,Π) and N ′ = (V ′,Π′) such that V ′ ⊆ V and
π′u(v) = πu(v) for all u, v ∈ V ′, then C(N ′) = C(N) ∩ 2V
′
.
Intuitively, though N ′ is embedded into N , its preferences
are not influenced. Hence it is reasonable that communities
inside V ′ are formed independently of individuals outside V ′.
Axiom 4 (World Community(WC)): For any preference
network N = (V,Π), V ∈ C (N).
This axiom is self-explanatory.
Before introducing the remaining two axioms, the concept
of preference should be extended to group-preference2 so that
equal-sized sets can be compared. Given a preference network
N = (V,Π) and non-empty disjoint sets G,G′ ⊆ V of the
same size, we say that s ∈ V group-prefers G′ to G, denoted
by G′ ≻pis G, if one can align the elements g1, g2, · · · , g|G|
of G and g′1, g′2, · · · , g′|G| of G′ so that g′i ≻pis gi for all
i = 1, 2, · · · , |G|.
For example, in the preference network in Example 1,
{3, 4} ≻pi2 {5, 6} since 3 ≻pi2 5 and 4 ≻pi2 6. But
{3, 4} ≻pi5 {5, 6} does not hold, because 5 ≻pi5 3 and
6 ≻pi5 3.
A set S ⊆ V is called self -approving with respect to Π if
for any S′ ⊆ V −S with |S′| = |S|, S′ is not group-preferred
to S by some s ∈ S. S is called group-stable with respect to Π
if for any non-empty G ( S and G′ ⊆ V −S with |G′| = |G|,
G′ is not group-preferred to G by some s ∈ S −G. Roughly
speaking, a set is group-stable if no subset agrees to leave and
join another set.
For instance, consider again the preference network in
Example 1. The set S = {2, 5} is not group-stable, since there
exist G = {2} and G′ = {4} such that 5 ∈ S−G group-prefers
G′ to G. Actually, S is not self -approving either, because
for any s ∈ S, s group-prefers {1, 4} to S.
Axiom 5 (Self-Approval(SA)): For any preference network
N = (V,Π), if S ∈ C(N), then S is self-approving with
respect to Π.
Axiom 6 (Group Stability(GS)): Given a preference network
N = (V,Π), if S ∈ C(N), then S is group-stable with respect
to Π.
2It is referred to as lexicographic preference in [Borgs et al., 2016].
There exist community functions satisfying all the axioms,
e.g., Ccliq and
Ccomp(N) = {S ⊆ V : S is self-approving and group-stable}.
C. Properties
Borgs et al. [2016] showed that this axiom system has nice
properties. The most impressive ones include the intersection
lemma and the lattice structure.
Lemma 1 (Lattice, [Borgs et al., 2016]): Under the opera-
tions ∩ and ∪, the community functions satisfying A, Mon ,
Emb, WC , GS , and SA form a lattice whose top is Ccomp
and bottom is Ccliq.
Due to the lattice structure, given some community func-
tions satisfying all the six axioms, one can construct more such
community functions using a mixture of ∩ and ∪ operations.
Lemma 2 (Intersection Lemma, [Borgs et al., 2016]): For
any community function C satisfying A, Mon , Emb and WC ,
C ∩ Ccomp satisfies all the six axioms.
By this lemma, designing a community function satisfying
all the axioms is reduced to find one satisfying the four axioms,
which is relatively easier to be satisfied. However, even we
have a community function satisfying the four axioms, it
remains hard to check whether a given set is a community,
since it is computationally hard to check the key axioms GS
and SA.
Theorem 3 ([Borgs et al., 2016]): It is coNP-complete to
decide whether a subset S ⊆ V is self-approval or group-
stable with respect to a preference profile.
Actually, we find that SA can degenerate so as to be
efficiently checkable, keeping the axiom system equivalent to
the original one. This is because GS almost implies SA, which
immediately follows from the next theorem.
Theorem 4: Given a preference network N = (V,Π) and
a community S ⊆ V with |S| ≥ 2, if S is group-stable with
respect to Π, then it is self-approving with respect to Π.
Proof. Suppose that |S| ≥ 2 and S is not self-approving with
respect to Π. Then there exists S′ ⊆ V \ S such that for all
individuals s ∈ S, s group-prefers S′ to S. Fix such a S′ and
arbitrarily choose s ∈ S. Assume that s′ ∈ S′ is the least
favorite individual in S′ by the preference of s. We have that
s group-prefers S′ − {s′} to S − {s}.
Since |S| ≥ 2, S − {s} is a non-empty set. It follows that
S is not group-stable with respect to Π. 
Therefore, we present a degenerate version of SA so that
it only deals with the case where |S| = 1. The degenerate
version is
SA′: For any preference network N = (V,Π), if {s} ∈
C(N), then πs(s) = 1.
By Theorem 4, any community function conforms with
{GS , SA} if and only if it conforms with {GS , SA′}. Consid-
ering that SA′ is efficiently checkable, we will use SA′ instead
of SA in the remainder of the paper.
III. STRENGTHENING AXIOM GS
After replacing SA with SA′, axiom GS becomes the
only difficult-to-check axiom in the axiom system. It is this
intractability that causes difficulty in constructing community
functions. In order to solve this problem, we modify GS in
a natural way, resulting in an efficient-to-check axiom called
SGS . Besides, we show that a community function satisfies
GS if it satisfies SGS .
A. Weak preferences
The hardness of checking group stability of a subset S is
partially rooted at enumerating equal-sized subsets of S and
V −S. A natural idea for tackling this problem is to compare
subsets of S directly with V −S, rather than with its subsets.
The first technical obstacle is to compare subsets of different
sizes, so we further extend the concept of preference.
Definition 1 (Weak Preferences): Suppose S, S′ ⊆ V , π ∈
L(V ) and k = min(|S|, |S′|). The preference profile π weakly
prefers S to S′, denoted by S ≻pi S′, if π group-prefers the
set of the top k elements of S to that of S′.
Consider Example 1 again. We can show that individual 4
weakly prefers {4, 1} to {2, 3, 5}. Specifically, since {2, 3, 5}
has three individuals and {4, 1} only has two, select the
top two individuals {2, 5} from {2, 3, 5} (according to the
preference of 4). The result follows because 4 group-prefers
{4, 1} to {2, 5}.
It is reasonable to borrow the notation “≻” from group-
preference, since weak preference is equivalent to group-
preference if |S| = |S′|. When |S| > |S′|, S ≻pi S′ means that
there is T ( S with |T | = |S′| such that π group-prefers T
to S′. When |S| < |S′|, S ≻pi S′ means that π group-prefers
S to any T ( S′ with |S| = |T |.
The following properties of weak preferences will be fre-
quently used in the rest of this paper. They immediately follow
from the definition of weak preference, so the proofs are
omitted.
Lemma 5: Given π ∈ L(V ), for any S ⊆ V and S′ ⊆ U ⊆
V with |S′| ≥ |S|, if π weakly prefers S′ to S, then π weakly
prefers U to S.
Lemma 6: Given π ∈ L(V ), for any S, S′ ⊆ V , if π weakly
prefers S′ to S, then for all T ⊆ S, π weakly prefers S′ to T .
In Example 1, suppose S = {2, 4} and S′ = {1, 3}, then
individual 4 weakly prefers S′ to S. Suppose U = {1, 3, 5}
and T = {2}, then S′ ⊆ U and T ⊆ S, which means that
individual 4 weakly prefers U to S by Lemma 5 and weakly
prefers S′ to T by Lemma 6.
B. Alternative to GS
Now we are ready to define the alternative SGS (namely
strong group stability) to GS .
Consider a preference network N = (V,Π). A set S ⊆ V
is called strongly group − stable with respect to Π if for
any non-empty G ( S, there exists s ∈ S − G which does
not weakly prefers V − S to G. Strong group-stability differs
from group-stability mainly in that weak preference rather than
group-preference is used.
Let’s arbitrarily fix a community function C.
Axiom 7 (SGS): For any preference network N = (V,Π)
and any subset S ⊆ V , if S ∈ C(N), then S is strongly
group-stable with respect to Π.
Roughly speaking, GS rules out a community S if there
exists a subset T ( S such that all members of S − T agree
to replace T with a common, equal-sized group outside of S,
while SGS does so under a weaker condition that essentially
captures two facts. First, T can be replaced by a group of a
different size. Second, members of S − T might not have a
common replacement of T (in case that |V − S| > |T |), but
they agree on kicking T out. In this case, it is reasonable to
rule out such communities; see the following example.
In Example 1, individual 4 weakly prefers {5, 6} to
{1, 2, 3}, which means that {1, 2, 3, 4} is not strongly group-
stable and cannot be a community according to SGS . This
coincides with commonsense, since 4 tends to leave {1, 2, 3}
and join {5, 6}. However, {1, 2, 3, 4} is group-stable and is a
candidate of community in the original axiom system.
Theorem 7: For any community function C, if it satisfies
SGS , then it also satisfies GS .
Proof. If some community function C satisfies SGS but does
not satisfy GS , there must exist a preference network N =
(V,Π) and a community S ∈ C(N) which is strongly group-
stable but not group-stable with respect to Π. By the definition
of group stability, there are two non-empty subsets T ( S and
T ′ ⊆ V −S such that |T ′| = |T | and u group-prefers T ′ to T
for all individuals u ∈ S−T . By Lemma 5, u weakly prefers
V − S to T , meaning that S is not strongly group-stable. A
contradiction is reached. 
IV. COMPLEXITY AND LATTICE
This section shows that the lattice structure, the intersection
lemma, and richness of the axiom system in Borgs et al.
[2016] still hold in our axiom system. More importantly, we
show that it takes polynomial time to check whether a given
community satisfies SGS .
A. Intersection lemma and lattice structure
Let A = {A,Mon,WC ,Emb,GS , SA′} and SA =
{A,Mon,WC ,Emb, SGS , SA′}. For a collection X ∈
{A,SA} of axioms, a community function is said to be X -
consistent if it conforms with all axioms in X .
We go on with showing that many good properties of A are
preserved by SA. An example is the intersection lemma, one
of the most important properties of A.
Before introducing the intersection lemma, we define the
intersection between community functions. Given two commu-
nity functions C1 and C2, we define C1 ∩C2 as the community
function that (C1 ∩ C2) (N) = C1(N) ∩ C2(N). Similarly, one
can define (C1 ∪ C2) (N) = C1(N) ∪ C2(N).
Then we define three community functions that will be used:
CSGS, CSA′ , and Cscomp, which are the maximum community
functions satisfying SGS , SA′, and both of them, respectively.
Formally, given a preference network N = (V,Π),
CSGS(N) = {S ⊆ V : S is strongly group-stable},
CSA′(N) = {S ⊆ V : if S = {s} then πs(s) = 1}, and
Cscomp = CSGS ∩ CSA′ .
Lemma 8 (Intersection Lemma): If a community function
C satisfying any axiom X ∈ {A,Mon,WC ,Emb}, then C ∩
Cscomp satisfies X , SGS and SA′.
Proof. Let C˜ = C∩Cscomp. If X ∈ {A,WC ,Emb}, C˜ satisfies
X because Cscomp is obviously {A,WC ,Emb}-consistent.
Hence, we just consider the case where X = Mon .
Assume that preference networks N = (V,Π), N ′ =
(V,Π′), and community S ∈ C˜(N) satisfy the condition of
Mon , namely, for all s, u ∈ S and v ∈ V , if u ≻pis v then
u ≻pi′
s
v. The rest of the proof consists of two steps.
Step 1: Since C satisfies Mon and S ∈ C(N), we immedi-
ately have S ∈ C(N ′).
Step 2: We prove that S ∈ Cscomp(N ′) as following.
If S is a singleton {s}, then S ∈ Cscomp(N) implies that
πs(s) = 1, namely s ≻pis u for any u 6= s. Hence, s ≻pi′s u
for any u 6= s and we have S ∈ Cscomp(N ′).
When |S| > 1, S ∈ Cscomp(N ′) if and only if S ∈
CSGS(N ′), so we only have to prove that S ∈ CSGS(N ′).
For contradiction, suppose S /∈ CSGS(N ′). Then there exists
a non-empty set T ( S such that V − S ≻pi′
s
T for all
s ∈ S − T . Thus, for all s ∈ S − T and 1 ≤ i ≤ k where
k = min{|T |, |V − S|}, the top-ith individual ui ∈ V − S
and the top-ith individual vi ∈ T satisfy ui ≻pi′
s
vi . Recalling
the assumption about N,N ′, S, we have ui ≻pis vi for all
1 ≤ i ≤ k and s ∈ S − T , meaning that V − S ≻pis T for all
s ∈ S−T . This indicates that S /∈ CSGS(N). A contradiction
is reached. Therefore, S ∈ Cscomp(N ′).
Altogether, we have shown that if N,N ′ and S ∈ C˜(N)
satisfy the condition of Mon , then S ∈ C˜(N ′). This means
that C˜ satisfies Mon , and the lemma follows immediately. 
In some sense, the critical role of the intersection lemma
lies in that it provides a normal form of consistent community
functions: the intersection of a simple community function
with Cscomp. Hence finding a SA-consistent community func-
tion is reduced to finding a {A,Mon,WC ,Emb}-consistent
one. This reduction will greatly help us construct desirable
community functions, as shown in Section V-B. The intersec-
tion lemma also leads to the lattice structure of SA-consistent
community functions, which is also true for A and is one of
the most striking results in [Borgs et al., 2016].
Theorem 9: Let C be the class of all SA-consistent commu-
nity functions. The algebraic structure T = {C,∪,∩} forms
a bounded lattice whose top and bottom are Cscomp and Ccliq,
respectively.
The proof of Theorem 9 is straightforward by the inter-
section lemma (Lemma 8) and the proof of Theorem 3.1 in
Borgs et al. [2016], so the detail is omitted.
The significance of the lattice structure lies in that given
some SA-consistent community functions, one can produce
more such community functions by a mixture of ∩ and ∪
operations.
According to the lattice structure, the richness of SA-
consistent community functions is to some extent determined
by the difference between Cscomp and Ccliq . Actually, the
difference is significant, with evidence from the number of
communities. On the one hand, for any preference network N ,
the size of Ccliq(N) is linear, by Lemma 19. On the other hand,
an example inspired by [Borgs et al., 2016] indicates that
the size Cscomp(N) can be exponential for some preference
network N .
Lemma 10: For any positive integer n, there exists a
preference network N = (V,Π) with |V | = n such that
|Cscomp(N)| ≥ 2⌊n/2⌋.
Proof. Let m = ⌊n/2⌋. Let H = {h1, h2, ..., hm} be a set of
m heroes, S = {s1, s2, ..., sm} be a set of m sidekicks, and
V = H ∪ S. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, define preferences πhi =
πsi = [hi, h1, h2, ..., hm, si, s1, ...si−1, si+1, ..., sm]. Let Π
be the preference profile consisting of all πhi’s and πsi ’s.
Consider the preference network N = (V,Π). Arbitrarily
choose a subset U ⊆ S. We will prove that H∪U ∈ CSGS(N).
For contradiction, suppose H ∪ U /∈ CSGS(N). Then there
exists a non-empty set T ( H∪U such that V −(H∪U) ≻piw
T for all w ∈ (H∪U)−T . Since any individual in H is always
preferred to any individual in S, it must hold that T ⊂ U ⊂ S,
implying that H ⊆ (H∪U)−T . Therefore, V−(H∪U) ≻pih T
for any h ∈ H . Now choose 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that si ∈ U .
We have V − (H ∪ U) ≻pihi T , contradictory to the fact that
si ≻pihi v for any v ∈ V − (H ∪ U) ⊆ S. Hence H ∪ U ∈
CSGS(N).
Since |H ∪ U | > 1, by the definition of Cscomp and CSA′ ,
H∪U ∈ CSGS(N) implies that H∪U ∈ Cscomp(N). Because
there are 2m different U ’s, |Cscomp(N)| ≥ 2m. 
Since the size of Ccliq(N) is at most linear (proved in
Lemma 19), Lemma 10 suggests that the collection of SA-
consistent community functions may be rich and the lattice
may be far from collapsing. The above lemma also implies
that the though SGS is stronger than GS , the restriction is
not too much.
B. SGS is efficient to check
Now we present the most important property of SGS , that
it can be efficiently checked. This is shown constructively,
through an algorithm inspired by the following observation.
Consider a preference network N = (V,Π) and a subset
S ( V . Suppose that S /∈ CSGS(N). There must exist a non-
empty set T ( S that all individuals in S − T weakly prefer
V −S to T . If we extend any set U ⊆ T by adding any u ∈ S
that does not weakly prefer V − S to U , Lemma 6 indicates
that no individual in S−T can be added since all individuals
in S−T weakly prefer V −S to U . So, if we happen to start
with U = {u} for some u ∈ T and extend U step-by-step, the
process must stop before U = S.
Based on this observation, we design an algorithm which for
each individual u ∈ S, initializes U to be {u}, and iteratively
extends U by adding an individual in S that does not weakly
prefer V − S to U . If and only if we get some U ( S that
cannot be extended any more, decide S /∈ CSGS(N). The
details are specified in Algorithm 1.
We illustrate how Algorithm 1 works using the preference
network in Example 1. Let S be {1, 2, 3, 4}. At the beginning,
u is 1 at Line 2 and U = {1}. Individual 2 is added to U at
Line 7 since individual 2 does not weakly prefer V −S = {5}
Algorithm 1 Decide membership of CSGS(N)
Input A preference network (V,Π), a subset S ( V
Output A boolean value indicating whether S ∈ CSGS(N)
1: procedure DECIDE(V,Π, S)
2: for u ∈ S do
3: U ← {u}
4: while U 6= S do
5: if ∃s ∈ S − U such that V − S ⊁pis U then
6: Arbitrarily choose such an s
7: U ← U ∪ {s}
8: else
9: return False
10: return True
to U . Then U = {1, 2}, and individual 3 is added to U since
individual 3 does not weakly prefer V − S = {5} to U . Now
U = {1, 2, 3} and S−U = {4}. Because individual 4 weakly
prefers {5} to U , the algorithm returns False at Line 9.
Now we prove the correctness of Algorithm 1 and show
that its running time is O(|S|4).
Lemma 11: Given a preference network N = (V,Π) and
S ⊆ V , it is in time O
(
|S|4
)
to decide whether S ∈ CSGS(N).
Proof. Correctness:
Suppose S /∈ CSGS(N). There must exist a non-empty set
T ( S that V − S ≻pis T for all s ∈ S − T . Note that the
For loop enumerates all u ∈ S. If the algorithm terminates
before any u ∈ T is chosen at line 3, it surely outputs False.
Otherwise, we eventually have u ∈ T at line 3. By Lemma
6, U ⊆ T always holds. Hence, the While loop will reach a
state where U 6= S and the condition at Line 5 is false. Then,
the algorithm also returns False.
On the other hand, if the algorithm returns False, all
individuals in S−U weakly prefer V −S to U , which means
that S /∈ CSGS(N).
Complexity:
There are two nested loops in Algorithm 1 and each loop
runs at most |S| times. The complexity of checking the
condition at line 5 is O(|S|2). So, the complexity of Algorithm
1 is O(|S|4). 
We are ready to show that Cscomp is efficiently checkable,
in contrast to the coNP-completeness of checking the mem-
bership of Ccomp.
Theorem 12: Given a preference network N = (V,Π)
and S ⊆ V , it takes O(|S|4) time to decide whether S ∈
Cscomp(N) or not.
Proof. If |S| ≥ 2, it is equivalent to decide whether S ∈
CSGS(N), which can be done in O(|S|4) by Algorithm 1.
By Lemma 11, it takes O(|S|4) time to decide whether
S ∈ CSGS , which means that it is in O(|S|4) to decide whether
S ∈ Cscomp.
Otherwise, S is a singleton {s}. In this case, S ∈
Cscomp(N) if and only if πs(s) = 1, which can be decided in
constant time. 
V. CONSTRUCTING COMMUNITY FUNCTIONS
Borgs et al. [2016] proposed an open problem: Is there an
ideal community function in their axiom system A? In this
section, we first solve the problem in the our axiom system
SA by constructing such a community function. Since SA is
stronger than A, this community function is also A-consistent,
answering the original open problem.
A. Consistent, constructive community functions
A community function C is said to be constructive if for
any preference network N = (V,Π), the membership of
C(N) can be checked in polynomial-time in |V |. Constructive
community functions are desirable, but it is not easy to figure
out a natural, nontrivial, A-consistent one (nontrivial means
different from Ccliq). Borgs et al. [2016] mainly considered
two families of candidates, namely Ccliq(g) and Charmonious(λ)
with non-negative function g and real number λ ∈ [0, 1]. They
showed that though Ccliq(g)∩Ccomp and Charmonious(λ)∩Ccomp
are A-consistent, they are not constructive in general. The
definitions of Ccliq(g) and Charmonious(λ) are presented here
in order to make this paper self-contained.
Definition 2 (Ccliq(g)): Given a non-negative function g :
{1, 2, 3, ...} → {0, 1, 2, 3, ...}, for any preference network
N = (V,Π) and S ⊆ V , S ∈ Ccliq(g)(N) if ∀u, s ∈
S, πs(u) ∈ [1 : |S|+ g(|S|)].
Definition 3 (Charmonious(λ)): Given λ ∈ [0, 1], for any
preference network N = (V,Π) and S ⊆ V , S ∈
Charmonious(λ)(N) if ∀u ∈ S, v ∈ V −S, at least a λ-fraction
of {πs : s ∈ S} prefer u to v.
In the context of SA, we have the following theorem which
helps finding consistent constructive community function.
Theorem 13: If a constructive community function C is {A,
Mon , Emb, WC}-consistent, then C∩Cscomp is SA-consistent
and constructive.
Proof. The theorem follows immediately from Lemma 8 and
Theorem 12. 
This theorem greatly simplifies the task of finding SA-
consistent constructive community functions, since it is rela-
tively easier to find a constructive one that is {A, Mon , Emb,
WC}-consistent.
For example, for any non-negative function g and real num-
ber λ ∈ [0, 1], both Ccliq(g) and Charmonious(λ) conform with
A, Mon , Emb, and WC . Hence, Theorem 13 immediately
implies the following lemma.
Lemma 14: The community functions Ccliq(g) ∩Cscomp and
Charmonious(λ) ∩ Cscomp are SA-consistent and constructive,
for any non-negative function g and any real number λ ∈ [0, 1].
Furthermore, by Theorem 7, the two families of community
functions in Lemma 14 are also A-consistent and constructive.
In the next subsection we go further in this direction and find
a community function having more nice properties, solving the
open problem posed by Borgs et al. [2016].
B. Cgrow: an ideal community function
An ideal community function should not only be construc-
tive, but also allows to efficiently enumerate the communities.
Borgs et al. [2014] (the full version of [Borgs et al., 2016])
defined two more properties for community functions C:
• Samplable: given a preference network N = (V,Π), one
can randomly sample any community from C(N) in time
P (|V |), where P (·) is a polynomial function;
• Enumerable: given a preference network N = (V,Π),
one can enumerate C(N) in time O(nk|C(N)|) for some
constant k.
Borgs et al. [2016] proposed the following open problem.
Problem 1 (ACCSE): Find a natural nontrivial community
function that is A-consistent, constructive, samplable, and
enumerable.
We solve the ACCSE problem in this subsection. Actually,
the following stronger problem is solved.
Problem 2 (SACCSE): Find a natural community function
that allows nontrivially overlapping communities and is SA-
consistent, constructive, samplable, and enumerable.
The basic idea of our solution is to reduce the problem
according to Theorem 13. Namely, if we find a community
function C satisfying A, Mon , WC , and Emb, then C∩Cscomp
is SA-consistent. Furthermore, if C is enumerable and |C(N)|
is polynomial in |V | for all preference networks N = (V,Π),
C ∩ Cscomp will be enumerable and samplable.
But how to find such a community function C? Our approach
is inspired by the method in [Palla et al., 2005]. Roughly
speaking, starting with best communities, i.e.,, cliques in a
preference network, we produce new good communities as
many as possible by extending existing communities. Intu-
itively, this growing process conforms with the formation of
communities in real life (for example, consider how friend-
ship forms). The key of the approach is properly defining
good communities. For this end, we consider the following
community function which is adapted from Charmonious(λ).
Definition 4 (Charmon): Given a preference network N =
(V,Π) and a subset S ⊆ V , S ∈ Charmon(N) if for all u ∈ S
and v ∈ V − S, more than half of the members of S − {u}
prefer u to v.
The following lemma shows that Charmon is efficiently
checkable.
Lemma 15: Given a preference network N = (V,Π) and a
set S ⊆ V , it takes O(|V |3) time to determine whether S is
in Charmon(N).
Proof. For each individual u in S and each individual v in
V − S, it takes O(|S|) time to determine whether a majority
of S − {u} prefer u to v, which means that it takes O(|V |3)
time to determine whether S ∈ Charmon(N) or not. 
Based on the idea preceding Definition 4, we define Cgrow
in terms of Algorithm 2, i.e., for any preference network N ,
Cgrow(N) := CLIQUEGROWING(N).
Algorithm 2 is self-explanatory. We now show that the size
of Cgrow(N) and the time complexity of Algorithm 2 are both
polynomial in |V |.
Lemma 16: For any preference network N = (V,Π), the
size of Cgrow(N) is O(|V |2), and Algorithm 2 terminates
within time O(|V |6).
Algorithm 2 The definition of Cgrow
Input A preference network N = (V,Π)
Output A collection R of communities
1: procedure CLIQUEGROWING(N )
2: C ← Ccliq(N) ⊲ C keeps the communities to be
extended
3: R← ∅ ⊲ R keeps the final communities
4: while C is not empty do
5: Arbitrarily choose an element S from C
6: C ← C \ {S}, R← R ∪ {S}
7: for u in V − S do
8: S′ ← S ∪ {u}
9: if S′ ∈ Charmon(N) then
10: C ← C ∪ {S′}
11: return R
Proof. According to the definition of Charmon, given S ⊆ V ,
if S ∪ {u} ∈ Charmon(N) for some u ∈ V − S, then for
any v ∈ V − S with v 6= u, a majority of individuals in S
prefer u to v. As a result, for any v ∈ V − S with v 6= u,
S∪{u} /∈ Charmon(N). This means that for any S ∈ C, it can
be extended by at most one u ∈ V −S in the for loop. Hence,
starting with any S ∈ Ccliq , at most O(|V |) communities can
be obtained. Since there are only O(|V |) cliques by Lemma
19, the size of Cgrow(N) is O(|V |2).
Then we discuss the time complexity of Algorithm 2. The
If statement at line 9 is executed for |V − S| times for each
community S. This fact, together with Lemma 15, implies that
the time complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(|V |6). 
Lemma 16 immediately indicates that Cgrow is enumerable,
samplable, and constructive. However, Cgrow is not SA-
consistent. For example, in the preference network of Example
1, the set {1, 2, 3, 4} is a community defined by Cgrow, but it
is not strongly group-stable since individual 4 weakly prefers
{5, 6} to {1, 2, 3}.
Fortunately, Cgrow ∩ Cscomp is a community function satis-
fying all the requirements in Problem 2.
Theorem 17: Cgrow∩Cscomp is a natural community function
that allows nontrivially overlapping communities and solves
both the SACCSE problem and the ACCSE problem.
Proof. By Lemma 16, we know that Cgrow is enumerable,
samplable, and constructive, and that the size of Cgrow(N) is
polynomial for any preference network N . Since Cscomp is
constructive, Cgrow ∩ Cscomp is enumerable, samplable, and
constructive.
It is straightforward to show that Cgrow satisfies A, Mon ,
WC , and Emb. According to Lemma 8, Cgrow ∩ Cscomp is
SA-consistent.
By Lemmas 19 and 20, Cgrow ∩ Cscomp 6= Ccliq , namely,
Cgrow ∩ Cscomp is nontrivial.
As a result, Cgrow ∩ Cscomp solves the SACCSE problem.
By Theorem 7, it also solves the ACCSE problem. 
Now we prove Lemmas 19 and 20 just used. First, recall a
property of Ccliq .
Lemma 18 ([Borgs et al., 2016]): Given a preference net-
work N = (V,Π) and S1, S2 ∈ Ccliq(N), then either S1 ⊆ S2,
S2 ⊆ S1, or S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.
Lemma 19: For any preference network N = (V,Π), the
size of Ccliq(N) is O(|V |).
Proof. For any preference network N = (V,Π), construct a
graph T (N) corresponding to Ccliq(N) as follows. Each vertex
of T (N) stands for a clique in Ccliq(N), and an edge between
two vertices exists if and only if the corresponding two cliques
satisfy the condition that one is a maximal clique inside the
other. By Lemma 18, T (N) is a tree. Now construct another
tree T ′(N) by extending T (N) in this way: for any vertex
u of T (N), if the corresponding clique S is such that there
is only one maximal clique S′ inside S, add a virtual vertex
v corresponding to S − S′ and add an edge between u, v.
Obviously, T ′(N) remains a tree and the number of vertices
of T ′(N) is no smaller than that of T (N).
Now we view T ′(N) as a rooted tree whose root is the
vertex corresponding to V .
The rooted tree T ′(N) has two properties. First, every inner
vertex has degree at least 2. Second, the leaves are disjoint
subsets of V , implying that there are at most |V | leaves. It is
easy to see that such a tree has at most |V |− 1 inner vertices.
As a result, the number of vertices of T ′(N) is at most 2|V |−
1, meaning that the size of Ccliq(N) is at most 2|V | − 1. 
Lemma 20: For any finite set V , there exists a prefer-
ence profile Π such that the size of Cgrow ∩ Cscomp(N) is
Ω(|V | log |V |), where N = (V,Π).
This lemma will be proved constructively. Before presenting
the proof, we show the basic idea of the construction, and
briefly explain how the construction algorithm works.
Intuitively, to maximize the size of Cgrow ∩ Cscomp(N),
we should maximize the size of Ccliq(N). Besides, in or-
der to absorb as many individuals as possible, for any two
members inside a community, they should have the same
preference order on the individuals outside of the community.
For example, let N = (V,Π) be a preference network where
V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and π1 = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], π2 = [2, 1, 3, 4, 5],
π3 = [3, 4, 1, 2, 5], π4 = [4, 3, 1, 2, 5] and π5 = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5],
then {1, 2, 3} and {3, 4, 1} are in Cgrow ∩ Cscomp(N) but not
in Ccliq(N).
Following the above idea, we design Algorithm 3 which
outputs the desired preference profile. Let’s first introduce the
notations.
Throughout the algorithm, σ stands for an arbitrarily fixed
total order on V . For any S ⊆ V , σ|S is defined to be the
total order restricted to S. For example, if S = {1, 2, 3, 5} ⊂
V = {1, 2, ...5} and σ = [1, 4, 3, 2, 5], then σ|S is [1, 3, 2, 5].
For a preference network N = (V,Π) and v ∈ V , we use Π|v
to stand for the preference of v in N . For any disjoint finite
sets W ′,W ′′ and preferences π′ ∈ L(W ′), π′′ ∈ L(W ′′), the
concatenation of π′ with π′′, denoted by π′ • π′′, is defined
to be the preference π ∈ L(W ′ ∪W ′′) as follows: ∀w′ ∈W ′,
π(w′) = π′(w′) and ∀w′′ ∈ W ′′, π(w′′) = |W ′| + π′′(w′′).
Intuitively, π locally preserves the ordering of π′ and π′′ on
W ′ and W ′′, but globally prefers W ′ to W ′′.
Algorithm 3 Find a preference profile with big Cgrow∩Cscomp
Input A set V
Output A preference profile Π on V
1: procedure GetProfile(V )
2: if V is a singleton {v} then πv ← [v]
3: else
4: Partition V into V1 & V2 s.t. 0 ≤ |V1| − |V2| ≤ 1
5: Π1 ← GETPROFILE(V1)
6: Π2 ← GETPROFILE(V2)
7: for v ∈ V1 do
8: πv ← Π1|v • (σ|V2)
9: for v ∈ V2 do
10: πv ← Π2|v • (σ|V1)
11: return Π = {πv}v∈V
The procedure GetProfile(V ) is in a divide-and-conquer
style. It divides V into two subsets V1 and V2 which are
balanced in size. Then it recursively determine the preference
profiles Π1 and Π2 on V1 and V2, respectively. Finally, the
preferences in Π1 and Π2 are extended, resulting in the
preference profile Π on V . The extension of each preference
in Πi is by concatenating it with σ|V3−i , for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Now we prove that the preference profile Π meets the
requirement of Lemma 20.
Proof. Fix V throughout this proof. Let N = (V,Π) with Π
being the preference profile found by the algorithm. For any set
U ⊆ V that appears in the recursion, if |U | > 1, the algorithm
divides it into U1 and U2. Let K(U) = (Cgrow∩Cscomp)(N)∩
2U , the set of communities of N inside U . Define F (U) =
|K(U)|, and g(U) = |K(U)\(2U1∪2U2)|. Obviously, F (U) =
F (U1) + F (U2) + g(U) always holds. The show that g(U) is
linear in the size of U , we make two claims.
Claim 1: |(Cgrow(N) ∩ 2U ) \ (2U1 ∪ 2U2)| = Θ(|U |).
This claim can be proved in two steps.
First, by Algorithm 3, each clique C ∈ Ccliq(N) ∩ 2U with
C 6= U must satisfy either C ⊆ U1 or C ⊆ U2. Recalling the
for loop of Algorithm 2, we have that if S ∈ Cgrow(N) is
obtained by extending S′ ( U1 with some u ∈ V − S′, then
u ∈ U1. So, any community S ∈ (Cgrow(N)∩2U )\(2U1∪2U2)
must be extended from (hence include) either U1 or U2.
Second, recall how Algorithm 2 extends U1 with individual
in U2. Suppose σ|U2 = [u1, ...u|U2|]. Since |U1| ≥ |U2| and
πv|U2 = πv′ |U2 = σ|U2 for any v, v′ ∈ U1, one knows that
for any community S ∈ 2U with U1 ⊂ S, it is a community
in Cgrow(N) if and only if S = U1 ∪ {u1, ...uk} for some
k ≤ |U2|. Likewise, any community S ∈ 2U with U2 ⊂ S is
a community in Cgrow(N) if and only if S = U2 ∪{v1, ...vk}
for some k ≤ |U1|, where the vi ∈ U1 are such that σ|U1 =
[v1, ...v|U1|].
As a result, Claim 1 holds.
Claim 2: If U 6= V , there are at most one community in
(Cgrow(N) ∩ 2U ) \ (2U1 ∪ 2U2) \ Cscomp(N).
This claim can be proved as follows. Arbitrarily choose S ∈
(Cgrow(N)∩2U )\(2U1∪2U2). We begin with the case U1 ⊆ S.
Suppose that S /∈ Cscomp(N). Then there is T ( S such that
V − S ≻piu T for any u ∈ S − T . Since U 6= V , |V − U | ≥
|U | − 1 ≥ |T |. We again go in two steps.
First, arbitrarily choose v ∈ T ∩U1 if T ∩U1 6= ∅, otherwise
choose v ∈ T ∩ U2. Suppose that U1 * T ; arbitrarily choose
u ∈ U1 \ T . By Algorithm 3 and the characterization of
(Cgrow(N) ∩ 2U ) \ (2U1 ∪ 2U2) in the proof of Claim 1,
we have v ≻piu w for any w ∈ V − S. Considering that
|V − S| ≥ |V − U | ≥ |U | − 1 ≥ |T | and V − S ≻piu T ,
it holds that w ≻piu v for some w ∈ V − S, which is a
contradiction. Hence, U1 ⊆ T .
Second, arbitrarily choose u ∈ S − T ⊆ U . By Algorithm
3, for any v ∈ U,w ∈ V − U , it holds that v ≻piu w. Recall
that V −S ≻piu T and |V −S| ≥ |T |, so for any v ∈ T , there
is a wv ∈ V −S such that wv ≻piu v. Because V −S = (U2−
S)∪(V −U), T = (T −U1)∪U1, and |U2−S| < |U2| ≤ |U1|,
we have wv ∈ V − U for some v ∈ T , contradictory to the
fact that v ≻piu w for any v ∈ T ⊆ U,w ∈ V − U .
Therefore, for any S ∈ (Cgrow(N) ∩ 2U ) \ (2U1 ∪ 2U2), if
U1 ⊆ S, we get S ∈ Cscomp(N).
Likewise, if U2 ⊆ S, we can show that S ∈ Cscomp(N)
except the unique case S = {u} ∪ U2 with u ∈ U1.
As a result, by Claim 1, Claim 2 holds.
Claims 1 and 2 implies that g(V ) = O(|V |) and for any
set U ( V that appears in the recursion of Algorithm 3,
g(U) = Θ(|U |). A simple calculation indicates that F (V ) =
Θ(|V | log |V |). 
Remark 1: Actually, Borgs et al. [2016] did not define
enumerable or samplable community functions, but we find
the definitions in [Borgs et al., 2014], the arXiv version of
[Borgs et al., 2016]. Borgs et al. [2016] also defined the sta-
bility and the open problem required that the community
function has stable communities which are samplable and
enumerable. We find that even Ccliq is not stable under their
definition, so we just ignore it.
Remark 2: Lemma 8 (the intersection lemma) plays an
important role in solving the problem SACCSE because
Cgrow itself does not satisfy SGS . To see this, consider
Example 1. Since {1, 2, 3} is in Ccliq(N) and {1, 2, 3, 4} is
in Charmon(N), {1, 2, 3, 4} is in Cgrow(N), while it is not in
CSGS(V,Π) because π4 weekly prefers {5} to {1, 2, 3}.
According to Theorem 3, if one uses axioms GS and
SA, then it is coNP-complete to determine whether a given
community is in Cgrow ∩ CGS ∩ CSA(N). This example also
shows the importance of getting rid of the computational
difficulties of checking the key axioms of GS and SA.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focus on axiomization of network com-
munity detection. As far as we know, only one paper
[Borgs et al., 2016] in this line studied overlapping communi-
ties, and it was on a general structure – preference networks.
Among the six axioms in [Borgs et al., 2016], two of them
(GS and SA) play a critical role, but the hardness in checking
them compromises the practicality of the axiom system. We
showed that in the context of the axiom system, SA can be
equivalently replaced by a degenerate version SA′. We also
naturally modified axiom GS to a stronger version called
SGS . We showed that both SGS and SA′ can be checked
in polynomial time, and most of the properties of the original
system are preserved. Furthermore, by the intersection lemma,
we found two constructive and SA-consistent community
functions. We also found an SA-consistent, constructive,
samplable and enumerable community function that allows
nontrivially overlapping communities, thus answering to an
open problem in [Borgs et al., 2016].
Although the current work is purely theoretical, it would
be beneficial to evaluate and improve existing community
detection algorithms in the framework of our axioms. This
is a direction of our future work.
Another direction is to further improve the axiom system.
Before Lemma 10, we discussed the richness, namely, many
community functions might be consistent with the axioms.
This seems advantageous since good community functions are
not likely to be precluded. However, selectivity should also be
considered, otherwise users would be burdened with selecting
desirable community functions from too many candidates. Can
we further improve the system of axiom by making a better
trade-off between richness and selectivity?
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